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An emotional and emotive issue?
Kapiti voters vow to fight water meter
The Dominion Post, 29 August 2007
Charging for water is ghost of policies 
past 
“Scoop” independent news, 30 August 2007
Whatever happened to water meter 
consultation?
Kapiti Observer, 13 September 2007
Competing demands for water resources 
and water services
• The right to water
• Water resources and the tension 
between rural and urban demands
• Rural infrastructure needs versus 
urban infrastructure needs
• Domestic versus non-domestic pricing 
tension
• Transparency and accountability in 
water resource and water services 
management
The pricing of water or pricing for the 
supply of water?
A
Critical 
Distinction?
Some Quick Sample Stats
• Water infrastructure investment 
2005/06 for councils excluding regional 
councils and Dunedin City was valued 
at $4,309,981,621 (source: Annual 
Reports – 72 councils)
• Wastewater infrastructure investment 
2005/06 was $5,0935,036,751 (71 
councils excluding Dunedin City and 
Manawatu District Council)
• It was not possible to discern from 
Annual Reports, Annual Plans & Long-
Term Council Community Plans 
(LTCCPs) how current rates are 
modelled.
Some Observations & Anecdotal 
Evidence
• Water services is supported by a large 
infrastructure investment in NZ
• Differing levels of pricing sophistication 
across councils
• Pricing model construct difficult to 
determine from annual reports, annual 
plans, LTCCP, etc.
• A different approach to sustainable 
management of water resources and 
water services 
The Australian Problem
• Focussing the debate – COAG, 1994
• Under-pricing of water services (NCC, 1997)
• Existing pricing coincidently considers cost of 
service provisioning (DNR, 1987; DCILGPS, 
2000)
• Australia is the driest inhabited continent in 
the world (NWC, 2005)
• Adoption of user pays pricing represents a 
major strategic change
• Water pricing has historically been politically 
sensitive (PWD, 1984; DNR, 1988; Miller, 
1999)
Some Background
• Water driven settlement and the right to water.
• Lumpy investments, rate spikes and political 
sensitivity.
• Queensland and secession
• Council of Australian governments
Political implications of the rate spike/jump
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The Pricing Choice
The access charging: 
excac xVCFBCR +=  
 
 Where:      
acR        =  access charge revenue. 
FBC  = Fixed Base Charge calculated as a 
politically determined percentage of 
unimproved/improved land value and, in some 
cases, a predefined service consumption 
allowance (life-line limit). 
 
X         = the units of service consumed over and 
above the predefined service consumption 
allowance. 
 
excVC   = a politically determined charge per unit of 
excess water services consumption. 
The pricing choice (Cont’d.)
The proposed pricing formula: 
rxVCFCRup ++=   
 Where:  
upR   = User pays revenue. 
 
FC  = Fixed direct and indirect overhead 
costs for the supply of water services that are 
insensitive to the levels of supply (DCILGPS, 
2000a: 13). 
    
X  = # of units of service consumed. 
 
VC  = Direct and indirect variable costs 
per unit of service supplied. 
 
R  = real rate of return (RROR) on 
infrastructure investment.  
 
The pricing choice (Cont’d.)
Given that the user pays formula promotes a long-
run marginal cost approach, the variable cost (VC) 
per unit of service component is:
Where:
Oam = per service unit contribution toward 
operations and maintenance costs less 
depreciation, interest and other financing/non-
cash charges (DCILGPS, 2000a: 13).
Os = per service unit contribution to 
operations support.
= per service unit contribution to 
planned future asset renewal, replacement 
and/or augmentation (10 – 25 yrs planning 
horizon, 20 – 25 year horizon recommended 
DCILGPS, 2000a: 9 & 15).
rraa
What is the intent of the ‘user pays 
pricing approach?
• The sustained supply of water services 
through consideration of:
– Current and future operating and 
maintenance cost; and,
– Future asset renewal, replacement and 
augmentation needs.
• Anchor point for these estimations are the 
current assets in use – value, age and life 
expectancy.
• Driven by future demand estimates 
constrained by estimated water resource 
availability.
A contingent view for identifying political 
and transaction cost adoption tension
Pay
for
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Choice 
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Findings
Table 2 Pricing Policy Choice Determinants for the Qld Urban Water Industry – 
Full Model 
 
  Yppc = A + β1POPCON +β2TYRDST + β3ELECTM + β4OAMPPS + β5CAPEXR +β6ARREAREV + β7ANGRO + ε
  
 
Variable Dir  
(+/-) 
Result (1) Result (2) Result (3) Result (4) 
  Coef.f Walda Coeff. Wald Coeff. Wald Coeff. Wald 
Intercept  .961 
(.381) 
.766 .541 
(.571) 
.322 1.189 
(.162) 
1.956 1.146 
(.156) 
2.011 
Political visibility (POPCON) - -129.107 
(.162) 
1.955 -124.227 
(.171) 
1.874 -111.903 
(.173) 
1.857 -112.930 
(.174) 
1.851 
Current asset age (OAMPPS) - -.002 
(.061) 
3.497 -.002 
(.052) 
3.773 -.003* 
(.025) 
5.030 -.003* 
(.025) 
5.040 
Current asset investment 
(CAPEXR) 
+ .372 
(.222) 
1.490 .359 
(.235) 
1.408 .313 
(.267) 
1.233 .308 
(.270) 
1.219 
Capacity to pay (ARREAREV) - -.006 
(.876) 
.024   -.007 
(.869) 
.027   
Growth trend (ANGRO) +  5.227  5.055  5.169  5.181 
Negative growth (ANGRO (1)) - -1.178* 
(.025) 
5.001 -1.122* 
(.028) 
4.828 -1.123* 
(.026) 
4.944 -1.123* 
(.026) 
4.937 
Positive growth (ANGRO (2)) + .364 
(.804) 
.062 .273 
(.849) 
.036 .241 
(.863) 
.030 .269 
(.846) 
.038 
Tyranny of distance (TYRDST) +  1.135  1.490     
Region 1              ( TYRDST(1)) - .526 
(.582) 
.303 .572 
(.542) 
.372     
Region 2              ( TYRDST(2)) - .599 
(.297) 
1.089 .651 
(.230) 
1.441     
Electoral  marginality 
(ELECTM) 
+  .779       
Safe                     (ELECTM(1)) - -.513 
(.462) 
.540       
Marginal             (ELECTM(2)) - -.220 
(.803) 
.062       
Very marginal     (ELECTM(3)) -         
          
Nagelkerke R2 29.2% 28.2% 26.4% 26.4% 
Log likelihood 98.501 99.294 100.778 102.025 
Model Chi-squared (sig) 21.784 (.026)* 20.991 (.004)** 19.507 (.003)** 19.479 (.002)** 
No Change % Classified Correct 89.1% 83.6% 85.5% 85.5% 
Adopt user pays % Classified Correct 68.6% 65.7% 57.1% 60.0% 
Overall % Classified Correctly 81.1% 76.7% 74.4% 75.6% 
Some areas of further tension
• Potentially requires management to disclose performance 
information about management of resources and assets.
• Passes asset renewal, replacement and augmentation 
costs directly onto users – potential for economic wealth 
transfer and price increases.
• Asset measurement choices, real rate of return 
considerations and potential for impairment of 
performance measurement and price increase.
• Higher household numbers use higher amount of services 
resulting in higher bills that are more sensitive in lower 
socio economic areas.
• Potential for inequitable treatment of those councils 
having older infrastructure assets and declining revenue 
bases
Some issues worthy of consideration
• Paying for supply versus paying for water. 
• Potential for inequitable pricing outomes: 
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• The issue of economic wealth transfers and a staged removal of grant and soft 
loan funding? 
  
 
Some issues worthy of consideration 
(Cont’d.)
• Pricing model measurement implications:
– Implications for using Current Cost or Current Cost 
derivatives:
• Real rate of return and monopoly rents;
• Distortion of the relationship between asset values 
and operating and maintenance costs due asset age;
• Should revenues derived for the purpose of 
future asset renewal, replacement and/or 
augmentation be separately recognised?
• Treasury management of these funds 
including debt to equity considerations and a 
potential role for CCA.
• User pays – a double edged sword?
Will present water 
management practices 
satisfy the future thirst for 
water?
